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INTRODUCTION 
 
Immigration minister Phil Woolas has attacked lawyers and charities that 
work on behalf of asylum seekers for undermining the law and “playing the 
system” by exploiting the appeals system.1 However, the case of Chikwamba 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department,2 handed down by the House 
of Lords on June 25th 2008, confirms the need for an effective appeals 
process, without which there would be no safety net for thousands of asylum 
seekers. The case concerns the application of article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)3 and the government’s policy 
regarding failed asylum seekers.  
Until recently, anyone who had remained in the UK unlawfully and had 
during their time in the UK formed a relationship and perhaps a family had 
no legal basis upon which to regularise their status in the UK. Immigration 
law and rules required that they return to their country of origin and apply for 
entry clearance to return to the United Kingdom under the appropriate 
Immigration rules.  The result of this was to separate families for lengthy 
periods, whilst the returnee was subjected to lengthy waits and had to satisfy 
strict immigration rules before applications were processed by British 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Buckingham. I am indebted to Kate Jessop, 
Solicitor, of Brighton Housing Trust for her helpful and insightful comments on 
earlier drafts. 
1 Guardian interview November 18th 2008. 
2 Chikwamba v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 40. two 
other important immigration appeals cases were handed down on the same day: 
Beoku-Betts v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 39, and  
KB(Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 41. 
3 Alias the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. 
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missions abroad. In addition, they were likely to incur enormous personal 
financial costs in terms of airfares, accommodation and application fees.  
This was the case even where article 8 of the ECHR had been invoked, 
unless the circumstances were “exceptional”. The Secretary of State for the 
Home Department (SSHD) successfully arguing that it was generally 
proportionate and fair to expect such people to follow this procedure lest they 
gain an unfair advantage in “queue jumping” those who had adhered to the 
law. 
Previously, the courts have accepted this approach, finding that 
government policy does not make it disproportionate to have a person leave 
the UK to apply for proper entry clearance on article 8 grounds from abroad, 
as it is necessary in the legitimate interests of maintaining and enforcing 
immigration control. Most Notably in R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department where Laws LJ observed: “It is simply unfair that he 
[or she] should not have to wait in the queue like everyone else.”4 Or in R v 
Ekinci v Secretary of State for the Home Department where as Simon Brown 
LJ put it: “…it is entirely understandable that the Secretary of State should 
require the appellant to return to Germany so as to discourage others from 
circumventing the entry clearance system…”5
However, the recent enlightened decision of the House of Lords in 
Chikwamba (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department6 seems to 
break this pattern. In this case a unanimous House of Lords effectively 
overruled the previous controlling Court of Appeal decision in Mahmood 
and, in a landmark and corrective decision, decided that an appeal against a 
refusal of asylum and leave to enter that is based on the right to family life 
protected by article 8 should not be dismissed routinely because government 
policy required the appellant to leave the country to apply for entry clearance 
from abroad.  
 
THE FACTS 
 
Sylvia Chikwamba, a Zimbabwean national, arrived in the UK seeking 
asylum on 22 April 2002. She brought with her a younger brother and a 
younger sister for whom she was responsible. Circumstances meant that she 
had had to leave behind two children by a man from whom she was estranged, 
and they had been taken into the care of relatives prior to her fleeing 
Zimbabwe; and yet she was still not yet 20 years old when she sought asylum 
4 R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] WLR 840 at 
para 26. 
5 R v Ekinci v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 765 at 
para 17. 
6 Above n 2. 
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in the UK as a port applicant. The dire situation in Zimbabwe was well known 
but her claim for asylum was refused by the SSHD less than two months after 
her arrival, and leave to enter was thus formally refused a few days later on 
June 8th 2002. The bitter pill was temporarily sugared, however, because at 
the same time the Secretary of State announced that he had decided to 
suspend removal of failed asylum-seekers to Zimbabwe until further notice, 
due to the well-publicised and deteriorating situation in that country. 
Paragraph 14 of his letter stated: 
 
“It is accepted that conditions in Zimbabwe have deteriorated in recent 
months and there were reports in December 2001 that some failed 
asylum seekers have faced difficulties on their return to Zimbabwe. 
While there is no evidence that returnees were being systematically 
detained for questioning or subjected to ill treatment, the Secretary of 
State was not satisfied, on the information then available, that 
unsuccessful asylum seekers could safely return to Zimbabwe. On 15th 
January 2002 the Secretary of State therefore decided to suspend 
removals of failed asylum seekers [and pending] the outcome of any 
appeal to the independent appellate authorities, be removed to 
Zimbabwe as soon as the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is safe to 
do so.”7  
 
Chikwamba was thus saved from removal for the moment though without 
legally enforceable status in the UK. And the question remained: why had her 
request for asylum been refused in the first place given the fact that political 
situation in Zimbabwe was well known at the time? It would appear that it 
was principally an issue of credibility. Chikwamba asserted that she had 
sought refuge in UK because she and her mother were members of the 
opposition MDC8 party and had been actively involved in opposing the 
Mugabe Zanu-PF9 regime through involvement with that party. It is apparent 
that the Secretary of State simply did not believe her claimed membership of 
the MDC or her grounds for concern about the treatment she would receive in 
Zimbabwe if she returned as a failed asylum seeker, and therefore refused her 
application; the Asylum and Immigration Appeal Tribunal who dismissed her 
appeal against the SSHD’s decision taking the same view.  
7 In the event, this general suspension was not lifted until 16th November 2004, some 
2½ years after Chikwamba was initially refused leave to enter. The suspension has 
since been restored and currently remains in force. 
8 Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) headed by Morgan Tsangirai. 
9 Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front, formed in 1987 from the union 
of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU).  
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Having been refused leave to enter and under (albeit delayed) threat of 
removal, Chikwamba remained in the UK unlawfully as a failed asylum 
seeker who had exhausted her statutory appeal rights and, but for the SSHD’s 
policy, would have been removed to Zimbabwe. She remained in this limbo as 
of June 2002, subject to the threat of removal as soon as the Secretary of State 
changed his policy.10 Once the ban on deportation of failed asylum seekers to 
Zimbabwe was lifted she could be removed to Zimbabwe, with at that stage 
no prospect of return. 
Around this time, Chikwamba met an old school friend, Mr Magaya, who 
was also a refugee from Zimbabwe but who had been granted asylum and 
indefinite leave to remain in the UK in June 2002. Their friendship blossomed 
and they were married in September 2002. It has never been suggested 
throughout the proceedings that this was anything other than a genuine love 
match. In effect, Chikwamba established a family life in the UK and the fact 
and duration of the suspension on removals to Zimbabwe may have given her 
some reassurance that she could stay. On April 14th 2004 a daughter, Bianca, 
was born. Bianca’s status as a British Citizen by virtue of her father’s 
indefinite leave to remain, coupled with her father’s refugee status, was to 
play a crucial role in the proceedings that followed that date.  
Previous to her marriage to Magaya, but during their relationship, and, 
presumably mindful that the Secretary of State’s suspension may be coming 
to an end, Chikwamba had submitted a further application for asylum and 
requested to remain on humanitarian grounds, asserting that her removal to 
Zimbabwe would breach her article 8 ECHR right to respect for family life. 
By a decision letter of February 4th 2003, the Secretary of State again refused 
to accept her application and added that he was not prepared to grant her 
exceptional leave to remain outside the Immigration Rules.  
She then appealed to an immigration adjudicator under s 65 of the 1999 
Act (since repealed and replaced by ss 82 and 84 of the 2002 Act). The 
adjudicator dismissed her appeal against both applications in May 2003 on the 
somewhat dubious grounds11 that because the situation in Zimbabwe 
(although “harsh and unpalatable”) was not sufficient to trigger a claim under 
article 3, it followed, the adjudicator stated, that she could not establish a 
claim under article 8. The IAT then refused her leave to appeal against that 
decision. 
Fortunately for Chikwamba, she had tenacious lawyers and charities 
working on her behalf (so derided by Immigration minister Phil Woolas).12 
Three months prior to the birth of her daughter she was eventually granted 
10 Above n 7. 
11 The Court of Appeal later described it as “a plain error of law” [2005] EWCA Civ 
1779, at para 12. 
12 See above n 1. 
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permission to apply for Judicial Review of the IAT’s refusal to grant her leave 
to appeal, and a consent order was made on the substantive judicial review 
hearing in June 2004. Eventually, two and a half years after her initial asylum 
claim and seven months after the birth of her daughter she was finally granted 
leave to appeal to the IAT in November 2004 - just after the Secretary of State 
had lifted the suspension and reinstated forced returns to Zimbabwe. 
 
IMMIGRATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL (IAT)13
 
The IAT heard the appeal on January 4th 2005. Although it was conceded 
that the adjudicator had erred in his approach to Article 8, the only question 
for the IAT was that identified in article 8(2) itself: whether the proposed 
interference with her established private and family life in the UK was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim of immigration control. It had been 
established in R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2004] 2 AC 368 that decisions taken pursuant to immigration control would 
be proportionate in all save a small minority of “exceptional cases”, 
identifiable only on a case by case basis. The test was to be taken from the 
IAT’s decision in M(Croatia) [2004] IAR 211, to the effect that it could only 
allow an appeal under article 8 where the disproportion constituted by 
removal from the country between private rights and public interests was so 
great that no reasonable Secretary of State could reasonably reach a contrary 
view. Since then the Court of Appeal in Huang v SSHD14 has superseded 
M(Croatia), holding that it is the adjudicator or appellate authority’s decision, 
not that of the Secretary of State that counts, and the test is whether the case 
was “truly exceptional on its facts”. The IAT concluded that to require 
Chikwamba to return to her country of origin would be a proportionate 
interference with her, her husband’s and their baby daughter’s right to respect 
for family and private life guaranteed under article 8 of the ECHR and so 
dismissed her appeal. 
Although this was, strictly speaking, adhering to government policy of the 
time, the decision was later heavily criticised by the House of Lords as having 
erred on an interpretation of article 8 at this early stage.15 At the time the IAT 
took the view that Chikwamba’s separation from her husband would only be 
for a “relatively short period” and therefore would not cause any hardship to 
either party. It is submitted that, in effect, Chikwamba lost her appeal because 
of the dogged application of government policy that a failed asylum seeker 
13 Now confusingly renamed the AIT from April 2005. 
14 [2005] 3 WLR 4891. The House of Lords later allowed Mrs Huang’s appeal and 
held there was no additional requirement of exceptionality in article 8 cases [2007] 
UKHL 31. 
15 See below n 33.  
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such as Chikwamba should return to Zimbabwe to apply for entry clearance 
(under the Immigration Rules) to return to the UK.  
 
THE COURT OF APPEAL 
 
In the Court of Appeal Chikwamba argued first, that family life with her 
husband and daughter could not be constituted outside the UK in Zimbabwe. 
Secondly, that as the SSHD refused to give her any assurance that her 
circumstances would comply with the specific and substantive requirements 
of the Immigration Rules so that she would be allowed to return,16 there was a 
real chance that her removal might cause the break up of her marriage and 
cause Bianca to be separated from at least one of her parents. She might find 
herself permanently in Zimbabwe with or without her daughter but certainly 
without her husband, whom even the IAT accepted faced an insurmountable 
obstacle to his own return to Zimbabwe.17 Hence her claim that refusal to 
allow her to make the application for leave to remain from within the UK 
would interfere disproportionately with her article 8(2) rights to family life.  
The Court of Appeal18 agreed with the IAT and dismissed her appeal in 
November 2005. They felt bound by the previous decision in Mahmood19 and 
the Court of Appeal in Huang (the Court of Appeal heard the case before 
Huang’s appeal was allowed by the House of Lords). To allow a presumption 
in favour of family unity “cuts across the clear rule of Mahmood and Huang, 
that it is only in exceptional cases that an adjudicator or the IAT can allow 
article 8 considerations to prevail over the public interest in maintaining 
efficient and orderly immigration control”.20 Chikwamba would have to 
return to Zimbabwe and seek entry clearance from the Entry Clearance 
Officer (ECO) at the British Embassy in Harare just like everyone else. 
This is the nub of the issue. As a failed asylum seeker remaining 
unlawfully in the UK, Chikwamba was unable to satisfy immigration 
procedures for entry clearance.  Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal, following 
Mahmood, seems to have assumed that these procedures in themselves struck 
the desired degree of proportionality. In effect they regarded article 8 as 
supplementary to consideration of the Immigration Rules, whereas in reality 
article 8 is engaged as soon as family life is disrupted quite irrespective of the 
merits or otherwise of the Immigration Rules. 
16 See below n 22 and 23. 
17 He had been granted asylum and indefinite leave to remain in the UK in 2002 on 
this basis. 
18 Auld LJ, Jonathan Parker and Lloyd LJJ; Auld LJ giving the single agreed 
judgment. 
19 Above n 8.  
20 Auld LJ at para 47. 
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LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
 
Sylvia Chikwamba based her appeal around the protection given to her 
family life by article 8 of the ECHR, which states: 
 
“Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life: 
 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.  
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
 
However, as has already been said, she was also subject to immigration 
procedures which were potentially seeking her removal. Procedure for entry 
clearance and appeals are set out in the 1971 Immigration Act (the 1971 Act) 
as amended by various subsequent Acts and decisions, and now contained in 
the Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act). In addition, 
Immigration Rules are made under section 3(2) of the 1971 Act. The 
Immigration Rules constitute a statement of the rules laid down by the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department as to the practice to be followed 
in the administration of the Immigration Act 1971; that is, for regulating the 
entry into, and the stay in, the UK of persons required by the Act to have 
leave to enter. Section 3(2) of the 1971 Act imposes on the Secretary of State 
a duty “from time to time (and as soon as may be) to lay before Parliament 
statements of the rules, or of any changes in the rules, laid down by him as to 
the practice to be followed in the administration of the Act…” In turn the 
Immigration Rules are interpreted in detail by the Immigration Directive 
Instructions issued by the Immigration Policy Unit. These are government 
guidelines as to how to interpret and apply the Immigration Rules; these are 
occasionally amended so as to reflect the Courts final interpretations of rules 
and policies. 
The parallel system for asylum appeals is to be found in the Immigration 
and Asylum Act 1999 as amended by the 2002 Act. In addition, Asylum 
Policy Notices issued by the Asylum Policy Unit ultimately become the basis 
of Asylum Policy Instructions (APIs) issued by the Secretary of State. These 
are statements of policy as to how to interpret and apply the legislation. APIs 
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(analogous to IDIs) cover the way in which applications are processed.21 APIs 
attract more litigation and thus attempt to reflect the ever changing case law 
on this area. 
Paragraph 28 of the Immigration Rules states that an applicant for entry 
clearance must be outside the UK at the time of the application. Even though 
Paragraph 2 states that Entry Clearance Officers (ECOs) must comply with 
the Human Rights Act 1998, the problem for Chikwamba was that, having 
been refused asylum and leave to enter the UK, she could obtain no assurance 
that she would satisfy some of the specific requirements for entry clearance in 
the Immigration Rule, forcing her to rely on article 8 instead.  
The relevant rules for entry as a spouse are contained in Paragraph 281 
and Paragraph 352A of the Immigration Rules. Paragraph 281(iv) provides 
general leave to enter as a spouse. It requires the applicant to show that she 
would be accommodated and maintained without recourse to public funds - a 
requirement that Chikwamba might not be able to meet. 22
On the other hand, Paragraph 352A makes specific provision for leave to 
enter as the spouse of a refugee and so there is no analogous requirement to 
Paragraph 281(iv), thus implicitly recognising the financial difficulties facing 
refugees.23 However, it does require that the marriage had taken place before 
the refugee fled the home country and was therefore also of no assistance to 
Chikwamba.  
On her return to Zimbabwe therefore, she would not have been able to 
satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules. She was thus outside the 
Rules and would have no hope of return to the UK unless she could 
successfully appeal under section 65 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 
1999.24 The issue for the House of Lords was therefore comparatively 
straightforward: 
 
21 The relevant API in the instant case is Article 8 of the ECHR, S 6: Consideration of 
Article 8 Family Life Claims.  
22 “Paragraph 281(iv) there will be adequate accommodation for the parties and any 
dependants without recourse to public funds in accommodation which they own or 
occupy exclusively.” (Consolidated Immigration Rules). 
23 “Paragraph 352A(ii) the marriage or civil partnership did not take place after the 
person granted asylum left the country of his former habitual residence in order to 
seek asylum.” (Statement of Changes HC 395). 
24 S 65 of the 1999 Act (since superseded by ss 82 and 84 of the 2002 Act) states: “(1) 
A person who alleges that an authority has, in taking any decision under the 
Immigration Act relating to that person’s entitlement to enter of remain in the United 
Kingdom, acted in breach of his human rights may appeal to an adjudicator against 
that decision… (2) For the purposes of this Part, an authority acts in breach of a 
person’s human rights if he acts, or fails to act, in relation to that other person in a 
way which is made unlawful by s 6(1) of the Human Tights Act 1998.” 
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“In determining an appeal under section 65 of the Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999 (the 1999 Act) (now sections 82 and 84 of the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (2002 Act)) against 
the Secretary of State’s refusal of leave to remain on the ground that 
to remove the appellant would interfere disproportionately with his 
article 8 right to respect for his family life, when, if ever, is it 
appropriate to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the appellant should 
be required to leave the country and seek leave to enter from an entry 
clearance officer abroad?” 
 
THE HOUSE OF LORDS  
 
Having exhausted all other legal remedies, Chikwamba eventually won 
her appeal in the House of Lords. In a unanimous decision, the House of 
Lords25 allowed her appeal on the basis that her removal to Zimbabwe would 
be in breach of the UK’s duties towards her under Article 8 ECHR: she could 
make her application from within the UK without having to return to 
Zimbabwe.26  
Lord Brown rejected Chikwamba’s “wider argument” that it would never 
be appropriate to dismiss a section 65 appeal brought on article 8 grounds on 
the basis that the appellant should leave the country and apply for entry 
clearance from abroad. It had been argued by Chikwamba that the combined 
effect of section 65 of the 1999 Act (being the general right of appeal on 
human rights grounds) and section 72(2) of the 1999 Act, effectively did deny 
her this right to appeal.27 Section 72(2)(a) states that an in-country appeal can 
only be denied when the Secretary of State certifies that the claim is 
“manifestly unfounded”, and, she argued, such a certificate can only be given 
when long-term removal is permissible. His Lordship held that this did not 
mean that the appellant was denied a right to an in–country appeal; rather it 
was to dispose of the appeal in a legitimate manner intended to promote 
immigration control.28  
25 Lords Bingham of Cornhill, Hope of Craighead, Scott of Foscote, Baroness Hale 
and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. 
26 The practical effect of which meant that she would be granted leave to remain in the 
UK on the basis of her family connections.  
27 See above n 24 for s 65. S 72(2) of the 1999 Act provides: “A person who has been, 
or is to be, sent to a member State or to a country designated under s 12(1)(b) is not, 
while he is in the United Kingdom, entitled to appeal—(a) under s 65 if the Secretary 
of State certifies that his allegation that a person acted in breach of his human rights is 
manifestly unfounded". 
28Above n 2, at para 34. 
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Nevertheless, in regard to the “narrower argument”, only comparatively 
rarely (especially in family cases involving children) should an article 8 
appeal be dismissed on the basis that it would be “proportionate and more 
appropriate” for the appellant to apply for leave to remain from abroad.29 In 
Chikwamba’s case it was clear that the needs for effective immigration 
control did not require her to travel to Zimbabwe to make her application. In 
coming to this conclusion, Lord Brown took into account the “harsh and 
unpalatable” conditions in Zimbabwe; the fact that enforced returns of failed 
asylum-seekers had remained suspended for more than two years after her 
marriage; and the expense (both for the tax-payer and for herself) in travelling 
to and from Zimbabwe.30  
By implication Mr Magaya’s refugee status and Bianca’s right to family 
life must also be taken into account; Baroness Hale reminding the House that 
in Beoku-Betts v SSHD,31 the House had already decided that the effect on 
other family members with a right to respect for family life with the appellant 
must also be taken into account when considering an appeal under article 8.32 
This conclusion was “obvious” to Lord Scott who added his “astonishment” 
that the case should have had to come this far.33
 
COMMENT 
 
Although Lord Brown disposed of the “wider argument” with 
comparative ease, he found the “narrower argument” as to when it would be 
appropriate and proportionate to dismiss such an appeal altogether more 
difficult. This was particularly so because he was anxious to avoid successive 
appeals under section 65. His Lordship felt that the Court of Appeal had 
misjudged this point because they had assumed that any application would be 
dealt with by the ECO solely in accordance with the Immigration Rules, but 
Lord Brown pointed out that this was an erroneous assumption.  Even if she 
could not bring her case strictly within the Immigration Rules, the ECO would 
be bound to decide her Article 8 claim in its own right because Rule 2 if the 
Immigration Rules requires ECOs (amongst others) to comply with the 
provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998. Thus, if the claim were rejected, 
she would have a further section 65 right of appeal, albeit this time from 
abroad, and with the possibility of successive appeals in the future.34
29 Ibid, at para 44. 
30 Ibid, at para 46. 
31 Above n 1. 
32 Ibid, at para 8. 
33 Ibid, at para 3. 
34 Ibid, at para 25 and para 26. 
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In helping them reach their decision the House of Lords reviewed the 
following: Mahmood v SSHD,35 Ekinci v SSHD,36 Mukarkar v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department,37SB(Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department.38
The leading case of Mahmood concerned a Pakistani citizen who entered 
the UK illegally and claimed asylum. A week before his claim was refused 
and he was served with removal directions, he married a British citizen with 
whom he subsequently had two children. The Court of Appeal concluded that 
only in “wholly exceptional cases” should an applicant for leave to remain be 
able to escape the requirement under the rules for entry clearance to be 
obtained abroad by having his substantive application to remain determined in 
the UK. To decide otherwise, it was argued, would mean that someone 
outside the rules would be in a better position than someone within them and 
would effectively jump the queue. In addition, there would be no breach of 
article 8 if there were “no insurmountable obstacles” to the family living 
together abroad. 
Although the HRA was not yet in force, Lord Phillips MR (as he then 
was) had approached the issue as if it was and concluded on the approach to 
article 8: 
 
“…(2) Article 8 does not impose on a state any general obligation to 
respect the choice of residence of a married couple. (3) Removal or 
exclusion of one member from a state where other members of the 
family are lawfully resident will not necessarily infringe article 8 
provided that there are no insurmountable obstacles to the family 
living together in the country of origin of the family member 
excluded, even where this involves a degree of hardship for some or 
all members of the family. (4) Article 8 is likely to be violated by the 
expulsion of a member of a family that has been long established in a 
state if the circumstances are such that it is not reasonable to expect 
the other members of the family to follow that member expelled.”39
 
Thus, in relation to the facts of Mahmood, although accepting that it 
would be harsh if an applicant was denied access to his children for some 
time, he nevertheless did not consider that “the Secretary of State’s insistence 
35 Above n 4. A case by which the Court of Appeal in the instant case had felt bound, 
and a case, their Lordships pointed out, that was heard before the enactment of the 
HRA 1998.  
36 Above n 5 
37 [2006] EWCA Civ 1045. 
38 [2007] EWC Civ 28. 
39 Above n 4, at para 55. 
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that the applicant should comply with the same formal requirements as all 
other applicants seeking an entry visa to join spouses in this country is in 
conflict with article 8.” 
Laws LJ’s sums up the view of the Court in regard to queue jumping: 
 
“Firm immigration control requires consistency of treatment between 
one aspiring immigrant and another. If the established rule is to the 
effect—as it is—that a person seeking rights of residence here on 
grounds of marriage … must obtain an entry clearance in his country 
of origin, then a waiver of that requirement in the case of someone 
who has found his way here without an entry clearance and then seeks 
to remain on marriage grounds, having no other legitimate claim to 
enter, would in the absence of exceptional circumstances to justify the 
waiver, disrupt and undermine firm immigration control because it 
would be manifestly unfair to other would-be entrants who are content 
to take their place in the entry clearance queue in their country of 
origin.”40
 
In Ekinci, the appellant was a Turkish citizen with ‘an appalling 
immigration record’. He had entered the UK illegally and claimed asylum in 
the UK, untruthfully claiming that he had not previously sought asylum status 
elsewhere. In fact, he had previously lived in Germany for some eight years, 
unsuccessfully claiming asylum there on two occasions. Simon Brown LJ (as 
he then was) concluded that there was: 
 
“…nothing even arguably disproportionate in requiring this appellant 
to return to Germany for the relatively short space of time that will 
elapse before he is then able to have his entry clearance application 
properly determined, if necessary outside the strict rules. That the 
Secretary of State is not contemplating or intending any longer-term, 
let alone permanent, separation of the appellant from his family seems 
to me abundantly plain . . .”41
 
By contrast, in Mukarkar, the appellant was a Yemeni citizen who 
obtained entry clearance as a visitor by deception and then unsuccessfully 
sought leave to remain as a dependent relative of his many children settled 
here. The Court of Appeal distinguished Ekinci on its facts and allowed his 
appeal to remain due to his need for “permanent and constant home help” and 
the unreasonableness that would be entailed in requiring his children to give 
up their jobs and return to the Yemeni to look after him. 
40 Ibid, at para 23. 
41 Above n 5, at para 19. 
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Lastly, in SB(Bangladesh), the appellant was a Bangladeshi woman who 
entered into an arranged polygamous marriage in Bangladesh and many years 
later dishonestly obtained entry clearance as a visitor to the UK before then 
unsuccessfully seeking leave to remain as being financially dependent on a 
daughter settled here. The IAT took the view that there was no reason why a 
properly structured application should be refused by an ECO in Bangladesh 
and refused her appeal. The Court of Appeal, however, indicated that the IAT 
was not entitled to make its own assessment of her prospects of coming back 
to the UK and allowed her appeal. After all, it would seem paradoxical if the 
stronger an appellant’s perceived case for entry clearance under the 
immigration rules the more likely he or she is to be removed from the country 
in order to make it. 
Lord Brown also gave consideration to the then current Asylum Policy 
Instruction on Article 8: Consideration of Article 8 Family Life Claims, which 
included, inter alia:  
 
“Is the interference proportionate to the permissible aim? …In many 
cases, refusal or removal does not mean that the family is to be split 
up indefinitely. The . . . policy is that if there is a procedural 
requirement (under the immigration rules, extra-statutory policies or 
concessions) requiring a person to leave the UK and make an 
application for entry clearance from outside the UK, such a person 
should return home to make an entry clearance application from there. 
In such a case, any interference would only be considered temporary 
(and therefore more likely to be proportionate). A person who claims 
that he will not qualify for entry clearance under the rules is not in any 
better position than a person who does qualify under the rules—he is 
still expected to apply for entry clearance in the usual way, as the 
ECO will consider article 8 claims in addition to applications under 
the rules. See Ekinci... 
 
In addition, it may be possible for the family to accompany the 
claimant home while he makes his entry clearance application, in 
which case there will be no interference at all.  
 
For example, where a claimant is seeking to remain here on the basis 
of his marriage to a person settled in the UK, the policy is that they 
should return home to seek entry clearance to come here as a spouse 
under the relevant immigration rule. Where the spouse can accompany 
the claimant home while he makes his application, there will be no 
interference. Where this is not possible, the separation will only be 
temporary. The fact that the interference is only for a limited period of 
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time is a factor that is likely to weigh heavily in the assessment of 
proportionality.”(author’s emphasis) 
 
This was the policy that was applied to Chikwamba, and Lord Brown 
remained unconvinced that the policy as a whole was indeed legitimate and 
proportionate. Implicit in his judgment is that he finds the policy 
fundamentally objectionable because it deliberately causes potentially 
destructive inconvenience to people’s lives under the pretence of being even 
handed. 
While recognising that there may be some occasions where the necessity 
of maintaining and enforcing immigration control could be a legitimate aim, 
he doubted that this was indeed the real benefit conferred by such a policy: 
 
“Is not the real rationale for such a policy perhaps the rather different 
one of deterring people from coming to this country in the first place 
without having obtained entry clearance and to do so by subjecting 
those who do come to the very substantial disruption of their lives 
involved in returning them abroad?”42   
 
It is important to note, however, that Lord Brown does not think such an 
objective is always unreasonable. Sometimes it will be necessary to enforce 
such a policy.43 Factors which may militate in favour of endorsing the policy 
strictly and requiring the appellant to return home to obtain entry clearance 
include the following: 
 
(1) Whether the appellant’s immigration record is ‘appalling’, such as 
in Ekinci where “few claimants come to court with a track record of 
such prolonged evasion and mendacity…” (Sedley LJ). 
(2) Whether the applicant has arrived in the UK illegally (for example, 
in the back of a lorry). If they have done so for a ‘bad reason’ for 
which entry clearance could readily have been sought (such as 
enrolling as a student) then requiring them to return home to seek 
entry clearance would be more legitimate than if they had entered 
illegally for a ‘good reason’, such as in order to advance a genuine 
asylum claim in good faith.  
(3) Whether the ECO abroad is better placed than the immigration 
authorities in the UK to investigate the claim, “perhaps as to the 
42 Above n 2, at para 41. 
43 Ibid, at para 42. 
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genuineness of a marriage or a relationship claimed between family 
members”.44
(4) Whether the Secretary of State has delayed in processing the 
application, in which case this would go in the applicant’s favour.45  
(5) The prospective length and degree of the disruption to the 
established family life. This would be a key issue in article 8 claims. If 
the disruption is minimal then it is more likely to be legitimate to 
apply the policy than if it is lengthy. Thus, it was legitimate and 
proportionate to remove Mr Ekinci (inter alia) because he was being 
required to travel no further than Germany and to wait no longer than 
a month for a decision on his case.46 Even so the case had been 
regarded as an “exceptional” one that turned on its facts.47 Cases 
involving children will be looked on more favourably.48  
 
His Lordship was also unimpressed by the queue jumping argument which 
had been used by the SSHD (supported by previous jurisprudence) as an 
excuse in favour of strict endorsement of the policy: 
 
“As we have seen, there is reference in some of the cases to jumping 
the queue, not having “to wait in the entry clearance queue like 
everyone else.” It is not suggested, of course, that others are thereby 
put back in the queue and thus delayed in obtaining entry clearance. 
On the contrary, the very fact that those within the policy do not apply 
for entry clearance shortens rather than lengthens that queue. What is 
suggested, however, is that it is unfair to steal a march on those in the 
entry clearance queue by gaining entry to the UK by other means and 
then taking the opportunity to marry someone settled here and remain 
on that basis.” 49  
 
However, Lord Brown does not agree that others would feel a sense of 
unfairness unless those like Chikwamba were required to make their claims to 
44 Provided that it did not lead to successive and unnecessary appeals with the 
appellant abroad and unable to give evidence in person. 
45 Later confirmed in EB (Kosovo) [2008] UKHL 41, decided on the same day as 
Chikwamba. 
46 Lord Brown does not elaborate on why geographical distance from the UK might 
be of relevance. Presumably because it is likely to involve the applicant in less 
expense and that they are more likely and it would be easier for his family based in 
the UK to visit him there? 
47 Above n 2, at para 29. 
48 Ibid, at para 44. 
49 Ibid, at para 40. 
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remain from abroad. Only in those rare circumstances outlined above should 
the queue jumping principle be used to defeat a claim based on article 8, so 
“… only comparatively rarely, certainly in family cases involving children, 
should an article 8 appeal be dismissed on the basis that it would be 
proportionate and more appropriate for the appellant to apply for leave from 
abroad.”50  
Primarily this is because the likely disruption to family life, including any 
difficulties the appellant or other family members might have in returning to 
their country of origin, should be considered in all cases and not confined to 
exceptional cases as had been emphasised in Mahmood (and had already been 
criticised by the House of Lords in Huang). This is particularly so in cases 
involving children and will also be relevant in considering the conditions of 
the country of origin. In Chikwamba’s case it was accepted that the conditions 
in Zimbabwe were “harsh and unpalatable” and Mrs Chikwamba might face 
the prospect of remaining there in such conditions for some months before 
obtaining entry clearance to enable her to resume her family life.  
There are other additional reasons why Lord Brown believed the 
application of the policy is unfair. The API policy statement, together with the 
decisions in Mahmood and Ekinci, asserts that a weak case under the 
Immigration Rules (being more likely to result in permanent removal) should 
not be used to strengthen an article 8 claim. To allow so, it claims, would 
undermine the interests of immigration control. But Lord Brown is puzzled by 
the inconsistencies in the Secretary of State’s justification and application of 
the published policy, since the policy appears to apply routinely to all article 8 
cases irrespective of whether the Immigration Rules apply or not.51 So, 
although his Lordship agreed that it was entirely understandable that a person 
whose circumstances fell outside the Rules should not be better off than one 
within them, the inconsistency of application of the policy could lead to a 
situation where it would be “bizarre if the weaker the appellant’s case under 
the Rules the readier should the Secretary of State and the appellate 
authorities be to excuse him the requirement to apply for entry clearance 
abroad.”52  
50 Ibid, at para 44. 
51 “A person who claims that he will not qualify for entry clearance under the rules is 
not in any better position than a person who does qualify under the rules—he is still 
expected to apply for entry clearance in the usual way, as the ECO will consider 
article 8 claims in addition to applications under the rules.” (Secretary of State’s 
Asylum Policy Instruction on Article 8). 
52 Above n 2, at para 36. And see, for example, that the policy did not seem to have 
been prayed in aid by the SSHD in Beoku-Betts who was not required to return home 
to obtain entry clearance despite the fact his case was outside the rules. Neither did 
the Secretary of State ever submit any explanation for why the policy was not applied 
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A further consideration is that the existing policy does not fit in with the 
desirability of the single, one stop in-country appeal that was anticipated by 
the 1999 Act.53 There is a strong possibility that the policy will result in a 
second section 65 appeal if the ECO in the home country, considering a 
person’s application following their return from the UK, should reject the 
Article 8 claim for what would be a second time. In such a case the appellant 
would be abroad and so unable to give evidence in person, quite apart from it 
potentially leading to successive expensive and unnecessary appeals. It is 
better that the article 8 claim, together with any asylum and other human 
rights claims, be decided once and for all together at the initial stage. If it is 
well founded, leave should be granted. If not, it should be refused. Thus, in 
most cases the UK court, and not the ECO, should decide whether the 
applicant’s rights protected under article 8 was breached and if so whether the 
breach was proportionate to the demands of immigration control. 
This is an important aspect of the decision and what makes it so far 
reaching in that even where the claim for entry clearance is likely to fail under 
the Immigration Rules, it would be less appropriate to remove since this 
would mean lengthy appeal proceedings that in turn would mean lengthy 
separation of the family concerned. It follows that if the applicant cannot 
apply under the Immigration Rules at all, where family life has been 
established, then removal would almost certainly be disproportionate as it 
would result in permanent breach of family life and the consequent breach of 
article 8.  
Lastly, Lord Brown was concerned with recent changes to the 
Immigration Rules introducing the prospect of substantial mandatory periods 
of exclusion following refusal of entry clearance or leave to enter, since they 
were bound to have a impact on future application of policy in article 8 claims 
although not, of course, affecting the instant case.54 His Lordship is referring 
to the changes brought about by Statement of Changes in February 2008. 
Following intense lobbying, however, the SSHD agreed to amend these 
Immigration Rules and laid Changes before Parliament in June 2008 so that 
the mandatory bars to re-entry would not apply to applications to join family 
members in the UK.55  
 
to the appellant Mr Kashmiri (the second appellant in Huang) who did not qualify 
under a rule requiring entry clearance but who was asserting a family claim to remain 
here under article 8. 
53 See shoulder note to s 77 of the 1999 Act. 
54 Above n 2, at para 45. 
55 See Immigration Rules HC 321 and 607 and now Paragraph 320(7)(c) of the 
Immigration Rules. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The decision in Chikwamba is a major endorsement of the right to respect 
for family life, overruling Mahmood both on the exceptionality test and the no 
insurmountable obstacles test. It thus departs from a long established principle 
of policy that required people who were in the UK unlawfully to return abroad 
and join the queue for entry clearance before rejoining their families. It has 
already been applied in the lower appellate authorities56 and has had a major 
impact on the way in which the UK Border Agency must now consider human 
rights claims under article 8.57  
The decision has also had an impact on consideration of article 8 cases in 
Immigration law as a whole, due to its shift in the burden of proof. Almost 
exclusively in immigration and asylum law, the burden establishing 
proportionality in in-country applications based on article 8 alone, now shifts 
to the Home Office rather than the appellant. Following Chikwamba, it is now 
the Secretary of State who must show that in an article 8 case, especially those 
involving children, it is reasonable to require an applicant to go abroad and 
apply for entry clearance.  
In response, the Secretary of State’s API on article 8 has had to be revised 
and their instructions to caseworkers rewritten to take account of the judgment 
in Chikwamba.58 It will no longer be possible for stringent existing policies to 
be applied indiscriminately and hopefully the UK Border Agency will be 
forced to adopt a more humanitarian and less bureaucratic approach to those 
who seek to remain in the UK on the basis of maintaining their family life. 
Having stated their previous position, the new Instructions continue:  
56 See, for example, Forrester (R on the application of) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2008] EWHC 2307 (Admin) where Sullivan J applied 
Chikwamba, concluding that it is one thing to say that one should have a fair and firm 
immigration policy, it is quite another to say that one should have an immigration 
policy which is utterly inflexible and rigid and pays not the slightest regard to the 
particular circumstances of the individual case. 
57 Two other House of Lords decisions, handed down on the same day as Chikwamba, 
have also contributed to a change in policy. In Beoku-Betts v SSHD, the House 
extended consideration of family life to other family members remaining in the UK, 
with the result that the SSHD and AIT should now take into account the impact of 
removal not only on the appellant, but also on those who share his/her family life, 
bringing the approach of the courts in the UK in to line with approach taken in 
Strasbourg; see Uner v Netherlands (GC) 18 Oct 2006, Maslow v Austria (GC) 23 
June 2008. In KB(Kosovo) v SSHD the House decided that delay by the SSHD in 
considering the appellants case may also be relevant in article 8 cases.  
58Asylum Policy Instruction Article 8, S 6: Consideration of Article 8 Family Life 
Claims (re-branded December 2008). Casework Instruction Article 8 (UK Border 
Agency, 7th August 2008). 
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“… the policy position has changed in light of the judgment in the 
case of Chikwamba v The Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(2008). The House of Lords held that although the policy had a 
legitimate objective, the way in which it had been applied (i.e. in a 
fairly universal manner) was essentially wrong and that it is only 
comparatively rarely that it will be lawful to require someone with 
family here to return home and apply for entry clearance, particularly 
where children are involved. 
The House of Lords emphasised that cases should, where possible, be 
considered fully at the earliest stage, i.e. in-country…The UK Border 
Agency, if minded to reject the claim, then has to show that the 
interference is proportionate, having regard to all the facts of the 
case.”59
 
Nevertheless, the government is committed to limiting the numbers of 
asylum seekers and migrants to the UK and, on past record, they have not 
been deterred from exploiting decisions that are fact dependent in a way that 
was not intended in order to achieve this end. In this way they ensure, with 
apologies to Tolstoy, that each unhappy family remains unhappy in its own 
way.60 All the same, the intention of the House of Lords in Chikwamba is 
clear. In considering claims based on article 8, particularly where there are 
children, all the circumstances of the appellant and his/her family must be 
taken into account. Once disruption to family life is established due to 
removal, then article 8 is engaged so that the merits or otherwise of the case 
under the Immigration Rules becomes irrelevant. 
This simple truth was what led Lord Scott to express his “astonishment 
that the case should have come this far”. It was “obvious” to him that Sylvia 
Chikwamba and her family should be permitted to remain in this country. He 
likened the present system to one of Kafka’s invention in its treatment of 
those who seek asylum: “…policies that involve people cannot be, and should 
not be allowed to become rigid inflexible rules. The bureaucracy of which 
Kafka wrote cannot be allowed to take root in this country and the courts must 
see to it that it does not.”61 Hopefully, the decision of the House of Lords in 
Chikwamba will help ensure that it does not. 
59 Ibid, p 2 post. 
60 “All happy families resemble one another, each unhappy family is unhappy in its 
own way” Tolstoy Anna Karenina (Penguin Classics, 1999) p 1. 
61 Above n 2, para 4. 
